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W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    llegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing has long been seen as a 
food and economic security threat by coastal States. This article focuses on 
India’s approach to IUU fishing in the waters of the Indian Ocean subject 
to Indian jurisdiction and in the adjacent areas of the high seas. Most of the 
focus on IUU fishing in India emerges from its impact on food, economic, 
and human security.1 Absent from this focus is the crucial distinction of how 
IUU fishing impacts Indian national security and the compliance of individ-
ual Indian states within the regional and international maritime regimes ad-
dressing IUU fishing. Accordingly, this article identifies areas for increased 
Indian cooperation with existing regional and international maritime regimes 
on IUU fishing. Finally, it suggests including IUU fishing in the national se-
curity discourse in view of the emerging geopolitical challenges India faces. 
In 2018, the U.N. General Assembly, at the request of the U.N. Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), declared June 5 “the International Day 
for the Fight against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.”2 Accord-
ing to the FAO, IUU fishing accounts for up to twenty-six million tons of 
fish each year.3 The economic value of this capture has been placed at be-
tween $10 billion and $23 billion annually.4 According to a 2019 study pub-
lished in Marine Policy, India provided $277 million in subsidies to its fishers, 
of which $174 million is believed to contribute to destructive fishing prac-
tices.5 IUU fishing directly impacts the food, economic, and health security 
of coastal States, including India, as well as further distressing the marine 
environment. Moreover, it is interconnected with several key societal issues, 
                                                                                                                      
1. See, e.g., GANAPATHIRAJU PRAMOD, ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED 
MARINE FISH CATCHES IN THE INDIAN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (2010). 
2. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANI-
ZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/iuu-fishing/fight-iuu-fishing/en/ 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
3. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANI-
ZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/iuu-fishing/en/ (last visited Oct. 
8, 2020). 
4. Id. 
5. U. Rashid Sumaila et al., Updated Estimates and Analysis of Global Fisheries Subsidies, 109 
MARINE POLICY, Nov. 2019, https://www.openchannels.org/sites/default/files/litera-
ture/updated_estimates_and_analysis_of_global_fisheries_subsidies.pdf; see also Sibi Arasu, 
India’s Fishers Need the Subsidies but India Doesn’t Need the Illegal Fishing, SCIENCE: THE WIRE, 
Apr. 12, 2020, https://science.thewire.in/environment/fishing-subsidies-big-trawlers-fuel-
tax-exemption-fish-stock/. 
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including drug trafficking, piracy, and illegal trade, adding to the myriad is-
sues faced by underdeveloped and developing coastal States in the Indian 
Ocean region. 
The emergence of IUU fishing as a national security threat is still unfold-
ing in the Indo-Pacific region but has not yet significantly impacted the In-
dian Ocean littoral States in the same manner it has in their Southeast Asia 
neighbors. Nonetheless, this article argues that there is a need to view IUU 
fishing not only as only a food, economic, and human security issue, but to 
recognize that it presents a larger national security threat. In the Indian con-
text, addressing this threat means strengthening India’s maritime legal infra-
structure to safeguard its sovereignty and maritime interests. 
IUU fishing is a national security threat because it undermines the na-
tional security of a country by adversely impacting its maritime security and 
governance structures. The article provides an overview of India’s existing 
domestic maritime laws and their enforcement by its maritime enforcement 
agencies, as well its compliance with international maritime laws concerning 
IUU fishing. As a template of State responses toward IUU fishing, the article 
briefly presents several Southeast Asian case studies then suggests measures 
India can take to effectively confront the threat presented by illegal fishing 
trawlers operating beyond its waters by engaging with regional and interna-
tional maritime legal regimes and organizations to address IUU fishing. 
IUU fishing increasingly threatens the global economic order and State 
sovereignty. States such as China have been operating distant water fishing 
fleets that often fish in the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of other States. 
This practice has led to States expanding their domestic maritime law en-
forcement capabilities to aggressively address IUU fishing. In some in-
stances, this has led to maritime law enforcement actions violating the sov-
ereignty of other States. Some States have engaged in aggressive behavior 
against foreign fishing boats in driving them away, violating the sovereignty 
of those States. Actions such as those of the Chinese Coast Guard activity 
against an Indonesian fishing vessel, as well as the sinking of a Vietnamese 
fishing vessel conducting fishing in its own waters, are some of the examples 
that have complicated the issue of fishing. In other words, IUU fishing no 
longer remains in the domain of non-traditional threats—human, economic, 
and environmental—but has now become a security threat to national sov-
ereignty and a State’s resources. 
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II. IUU FISHING IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
 
The perils of IUU fishing are not new to the waters of the Indian Ocean. In 
the past, however, they have largely been subsumed with other non-tradi-
tional security threats. Recent studies highlight that transnational organized 
criminal groups use IUU fishing in the commission of other crimes, such as 
the trafficking of drugs, arms, and persons.6 Most Indian Ocean littoral 
States have underdeveloped economies marred by poorly developed and im-
plemented government policies, administrative systems beset by corruption, 
and complicated issues of neglect and marginalization that often push pov-
erty-stricken fishers to adopt illegal fishing practices and assist criminal or-
ganizations conducting transnational crimes. 
Narrowly divided and often confusing demarcation of maritime delimi-
tation zones between some closely located Asian coastal States further com-
plicates matters for fishers that unknowingly fish in other States’ waters. Fre-
quent cases of IUU fishing arrests by India and Sri Lanka in the Palk Strait, 
by India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch, and by India and Bangladesh in 
the Bay of Bengal attest to this point. 
Another subject in the limelight of IUU fishing are allegations made by 
international organizations of misuse of the subsidies provided by the gov-
ernments in the region to its fishers.7 For example, the Indian government 
provides fuel subsidies to fishers to alleviate poverty and provide economic 
assistance. This often results in the adoption of illegal fishing practices, such 
as overfishing using larger trawlers. In providing subsidies, the Indian gov-
ernment is balancing poverty alleviation in its coastal communities against 
the harm done to its fishing ecosystem. In ongoing World Trade Organiza-
                                                                                                                      
6. See, e.g., CATHY HAENLEIN, BELOW THE SURFACE: HOW ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED 
AND UNREGULATED FISHING THREATENS OUR SECURITY (2017), https://rusi.org/ 
sites/default/files/201707_rusi_below_the_surface_haenlein.pdf; Illegal, Unreported and Un-
regulated (IUU) Fishing, Links between IUU Fishing and Other Crimes, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/iuu-fishing/back-
ground/links-between-iuu-fishing-and-other-crimes/en/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
7. See, e.g., Isabel Jarrett & Reyna Gilbert, Fisheries Subsidies Reform Could Reduce Overfishing 
and Illegal Fishing Case Studies Find, PEW (July 22, 2020), https://www. pewtrusts.org/en/re-
search-and-analysis/articles/2020/07/22/fisheries-subsidies-reform-could-reduce-over-
fishing-and-illegal-fishing-case-studies-find; see also Michael Crispino, 5 Ways Harmful Fisher-
ies Subsidies Impact Coastal Communities, WORLD WILDLIFE FEDERATION (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/5-ways-harmful-fisheries-subsidies-impact-coastal-
communities. 
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tion negotiations prohibiting certain subsidies that contribute to overcapac-
ity and overfishing, India is seeking an exemption that would permit contin-
ued subsidies.8 India has stated that four million fishers could be negatively 
impacted if the subsidies ended.9 Pressing domestic and inter-State regional 
issues, as well as political interests, has left little space for the larger discus-
sion of IUU fishing as an emerging threat to national security. 
Two of the most recent contentious issues related to IUU fishing within 
the region have been the deployment of fishing vessels in areas of maritime 
territorial disputes and the use of military force against illegal fishers within 
EEZ of the affected State. Asian States have regularly witnessed illegal fish-
ers and trawlers, largely from China, in their waters. The Chinese distant-
water fleet systematically and continuously violates the EEZs of several 
countries around the world, jeopardizing those countries’ national security.10 
The Chinese fishing fleet has been accused of plundering sea resources as 
far away as Africa11 and South America.12 
State responses to such illegal activities require close study as they reflect 
individual state position and the capacity to respond to IUU activities. They 
also indicate the degree to which States conform to established norms and 
legal regimes. In high-profile cases reported in 201613 and 2019,14 the Argen-
tine Coast Guard opened fire on Chinese fishing vessels engaged in IUU 
                                                                                                                      
8. Amiti Sen, India Pushes for ‘Permissible’ Fisheries Subsidies at WTO, BUSINESS LINE, Feb. 
18, 2020, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-pushes-for-permissible-
fishery-subsidies-at-wto/article30853349.ece#:~:text=In-
dia%20has%20made%20a%20case,for%20navigation%20and%20safety%20equipment. 
9. Id. 
10. David Tickler et al., Far from Home: Distance Patterns of Global Fishing Fleets, SCIENCE 
ADVANCES, Aug. 1, 2018, https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar 3279. 
11. Mozambique Fishermen Point to China as Fish Stocks Dwindle, FISHERIES COMMITTEE 
FOR THE WEST CENTRAL GULF OF GUINEA (Jan. 20, 2020), https://fcwc-fish.org/other-
news/mozambiques-fishermen-point-to-china-as-fish-stocks-dwindle. 
12. 260 Chinese Boats Fish near Galapagos, Ecuador on Alert, TIMES OF INDIA, July 31, 2020, 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/260-chinese-boats-fish-near-ga-
lapagos-ecuador-on-alert/articleshow/77276746.cms; Marco Aquino, Chinese Fishing Fleet off 
Peru Stirs Up Diplomatic Waters, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 26, 2020, https://www. 
smh.com.au/world/south-america/chinese-fishing-fleet-off-peru-stirs-up-diplomatic-wa-
ters-20200926-p55zi5.html. 
13. Tom Kadie, The Price of a Fish: Illegal Fishing and the Consequences for Latin America, 
BERKELEY POLITICAL REVIEW (May 21, 2018), https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2018/05/ 21/ 
the-price-of-a-fish-illegal-fishing-and-the-consequences-for-latin-america/. 
14. Mark Godfrey, Argentine Coast Guard Opens Fire on Chinese Fishing Vessel, SEAFOOD-
SOURCE, (Mar. 04, 2019), https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/argentine-
coast-guard-opens-fire-on-chinese-fishing-vessel. 
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fishing in its EEZ. These fishing vessels reportedly do not adhere to the 
requirement mandated by international regulations to keep their automatic 
identification systems transmitters continuously activated. At the same time, 
crews comprised of maritime militia disguised as civilian fishers operate Chi-
nese fishing vessels in waters near the South China Sea.15 These develop-
ments call for including IUU fishing in the mainstream of the national secu-
rity discourse. Though there are no established cases of China’s maritime 
militia in the Indian Ocean, a Chinese fishing fleet was present in the Indian 
EEZ in 2019.16 
States have responded differently to the threat presented by IUU fishing. 
For the sake of coherence, due to their similar socioeconomic systems and 
geographical proximity, this article only considers responses to combat IUU 
fishing practices by Asian coastal States. Just as has been seen globally, these 
States have shown varied responses to illegal fishing. The responses range 
from the adoption of destructive practices, such as the shooting and sinking 
of foreign ships in their EEZs by coast guards and navies, to capacity build-
ing efforts, such as strengthening domestic regulatory mechanisms and mar-
itime infrastructure, as Thailand and Vietnam have done. 
Indonesia has taken an especially strong stance against IUU fishing, sink-
ing as many as fifty illegal foreign vessels in 2019,17 although this figure was 
lower than 2018, where it sank as many as 125 vessels.18 In one incident, a 
China Coast Guard vessel helped a Chinese fishing boat escape following its 
arrest for unlawful fishing, thus frustrating Indonesian enforcement efforts.19 
Other Southeast Asia countries have focused on curbing IUU fishing by 
their nationals. This focus was prompted by the European Commission’s 
                                                                                                                      
15. Gregory Poling, China’s Hidden Navy, FOREIGN POLICY, June 25, 2019, https://for-
eignpolicy.com/2019/06/25/chinas-secret-navy-spratlys-southchinasea-chinesenavy-mari-
timemilitia/. 
16 Chinese Trawlers Sighted in the Indian Ocean: Official, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Jan. 29, 2020, 
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/chinese-trawlers-sighted-in-indian-ocean-
official/story-1IKLL308YtvPuMoXKfmqzI.html. 
17. Indonesia Sinks 51 Fishing Boats, BANGKOK POST, May 04, 2019, https://www.bang-
kokpost.com/world/1672020/indonesia-sinks-51-fishing-boats. 
18. Id. 
19. Haeril Halim, Anggi M. Lubis & Stefani Ribka, RI Confronts China on Fishing, JA-
KARTA POST, Mar. 21, 2016, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/21/ri-con-
fronts-china-fishing.html. 
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carding process, which identifies non-European Union countries having in-
adequate measures to prevent and deter IUU fishing.20 Under this process, 
countries are issued “yellow cards,” a formal warning that if improvement is 
not forthcoming, they may be banned from exporting fish to the European 
Union market.21 Several Asian countries, including Vietnam, Thailand, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Cambodia, have been issued yellow cards.22 Yellow 
cards may be revoked upon a showing of improved governance of its fish-
eries.23 
In its effort to have its yellow card revoked, Vietnam focused initially on 
tightening the surveillance mechanism to restrict illegal fishing in foreign wa-
ters by its fishers. The Fisheries Act of 2015, as amended in 2017, requires 
fishing boats of 30 gross tons to have a tracking system installed and sets a 
time limit on the number of days boats are allowed to be at sea.24 Further 
amendments in 2019 were designed to ensure compliance with various in-
ternational regulations.25 Fines and loss of fishing licenses are authorized for 
illegal fishing in foreign waters.26 
Similarly, the Thai government has focused on strengthening its mari-
time law enforcement, inspections, and enforcement of relevant conventions 
to address IUU fishing.27 It requires monitoring, control, and surveillance 
(MCS) systems on Thai-flagged oversea fishing vessels, with the goal of pre-
venting, deterring, and eliminating IUU fishing outside Thai waters, both in 
waters of coastal States and on the high seas.28 
                                                                                                                      
20. EU Carding Decisions, IUUWATCH, http://www.iuuwatch.eu/map-of-eu-carding-
decisions/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
21. Id. 
22. Stephen Chin, A Hard Tackle against Illegal Fishing, ASEAN POST, Aug 7, 2018, 
https://theaseanpost.com/article/hard-tackle-against-illegal-fishing. 
23. See Yiamyut Suttichaya, Vietnam’s Struggle over IUU Fishing Warning, Fatal to Its Fish-
ermen?, PRACHATAI, Apr. 3, 2019, https://prachatai.com/english/node/8008. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Thailand’s Progress in Com-
bating IUU Fishing: Thailand’s Response to the Comments of Human Rights Watch on the 
Protection of Labour in Fisheries Sector (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.thaiembassy.ch/ 
Content/Embassy/140.html. 
28. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Thailands [sic] Actions on Combating IUU 
Fishing, UN OCEAN CONFERENCE, https://oceanconference.un.org/commitments/?id= 
18205 (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
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Indian Ocean States have confronted the same issues as those faced by 
Southeast Asian States—their own fishers conducting IUU fishing in neigh-
boring waters and vice versa, as well as the increased presence of large, dis-
tant water fishing fleets from outside the region. In one example of the latter, 
on June 7, 2019, ten Chinese fishing vessels belonging to the Fu Yuan Yu 
fleet, owned by Dongxinglong Ocean Fishing Company based in Fujian 
province, entered Indian waters near the state of Maharashtra on the Arabian 
Sea.29 These vessels had received permission to enter Indian waters in ac-
cordance with customary international law concerning vessels in distress30 
from the Indian Coast Guard to shelter in the port of Ratnagiri during cy-
clone Vayu.31 
A later investigation determined these vessels had engaged in illegal fish-
ing activities in the Indian EEZ and may have harvested up to 80,000 tons 
of marine life a month.32 The fleet also carried illegal gear, such as drifting 
gill nets, bottom trawl nets, and dolphin attracting devices.33 Such devices 
are banned by many national fisheries commissions and are under investiga-
tion by international maritime agencies.34 Further, according to an IUU Risk 
Intelligence report, the Fu Yuan Yu fleet had already engaged in IUU fishing 
activities in the southern Indian Ocean and South African waters.35 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
29. See Badri Chatterjee, In Troubled Waters: 10 Chinese Vessels Found Fishing Illegally in 
Maharashtra, HINDUSTAN TIMES, June 20, 2019, https://www.hindustantimes.com/ mum-
bai-news/in-troubled-waters-10-chinese-vessels-found-fishing-illegally-in-maharash-
tra/story-FigOPCnmT3o0xuSDeqFjvN.html; Manoj Viswanathan, Fishermen Cry Foul as 
Chinese Trawlers “Milk” Indian Seas, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS, June 27, 2019, https://www. 
newindianexpress.com/states/kerala/2019/jun/27/fishermen-cry-foul-as-chinese-trawl-
ers-milk-indian-seas-1995919.html. 
30. See R. R. CHURCHILL & A. V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 63 (3d ed. 1999). 
31. Jagyaseni Biswas, Chinese Vessels Caught Fishing in Indian EEZ Points at Larger Issue of 
Illegal Resource Exploitation, MONEY CONTROL (June 26, 2019), https://www.moneycon-
trol.com/news/india/chinese-vessels-caught-fishing-in-indian-eez-points-at-larger-issue-
of-illegal-resource-exploitation-4129181.html. 
32. Chatterjee, supra note 29; Viswanathan, supra note 29. 
33. Biswas, supra note 31. 
34. Id. 
35. Pramond Ganapathiraju, 3 Chinese Squid Jiggers in South African Waters – Illegal Fishing 
or Innocent Passage, IUU RISK INTELLIGENCE (May 29, 2016), https://iuuriskintelli-
gence.com/chinese-squid-jiggers-south-african-waters-illegal-fishing-innocent-passage/. 
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III. INDIA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING IUU FISHING 
 
A. Governing the Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
The coastline of India measures 7,517 kilometers, distributed among nine 
coastal states and four union territories; the coastal states are Gujarat, Maha-
rashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, and 
West Bengal.36 These state governments govern the territorial sea, which ex-
tends up to 12 nautical miles from the coastline. India’s EEZ, which is gov-
erned by the national government, encompasses an area of 2,305,143 square 
kilometers.37 
India is the second-largest fish producing country in the world, account-
ing for 6.3 percent of global fish production and sustaining 14,500,000 fish-
ers.38 Thirty percent of the EEZ is spread across the Andaman, Nicobar, and 
Lakshadweep Islands, but only 5 percent of the potential tuna resource in 
this area is currently harvested.39 The Indian Department of Fisheries has 
observed, “that there is a huge potential [to] harness[] tuna and tuna-like 
species” in this area.40 But this area too is vulnerable to illegal fishing. 
Taking cognizance of increasing incidents of IUU fishing, the Indian 
government introduced the Marine Fisheries (Regulation and Management) 
Bill, 2019.41 To curb illegal deep trawler fishing, the bill provides for the im-
poundment of foreign fishing vessels fishing in the EEZ and a fine for the 
owner or master.42 It also issues regulations for foreign fishing vessels trans-
iting the EEZ43 and criminal penalties for violating those regulations.44 The 
                                                                                                                      
36. 9 Indian States with Longest Coastline of Sea, WALK THROUGH INDIA, 
http://www.walkthroughindia.com/offbeat/9-indian-states-with-longest-coastline-of-sea/ 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
37. Geoffrey Migiro, Countries with the Largest Exclusive Economic Zone, WORLD ATLAS 
(June 29, 2018), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-largest-exclu-
sive-economic-zones.html. 
38. India Accounts for 6.3% of Global Fish Production: Fisheries Dept, BUSINESS STANDARD, 
June 18, 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/india-accounts-for-
6-3-of-global-fish-production-fisheries-dept-119061800013_1.html. 
39. Fisheries, U.T. Administration of Lakshadweep, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, https://lak-
shadweep.gov.in/departments/fisheries/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
40. See supra note 38. 
41. See Marine Fisheries Regulation and Management (MFRM) Bill 2019. 
42. Id. ch. VIII, § 16(2). 
43. Id. ch. IX, § 22(2)(g). 
44. Id. ch. VIII, § 16(4). 
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bill requires Indian fishers to obtain a license to fish in the EEZ45 and for 
the impoundment of vessels and imposition of fines when a license is not 
obtained or the conditions of the license are violated.46 Further, it provides 
for the establishment of a MCS system to ensure compliance with fishery 
management measures.47  
The bill defined IUU fishing by incorporating the following previous 
definitions of illegal fishing, unreported fishing, and unregulated fishing ap-
pearing in Indian legislation: 
 
(A) Illegal fishing: 
(i) conducted by Indian fishing vessels in the Exclusive Economic Zone of 
India without the permit issued under this Act;  
(ii) conducted by foreign vessels in the maritime zones of India;  
(iii) conducted by Indian flag vessels in contravention of the conservation 
and management measures adopted by Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization to which India is a party, or relevant provisions of the appli-
cable international law; 
 
(B) Unreported fishing: 
(i) which have not been reported, or have been misreported to the authority 
notified under this Act, in contravention of this Act and the Rules and 
Regulations framed thereunder; 
 
(C) Unregulated fishing: 
(i) by an Indian fishing vessel, in a manner that is not consistent with or 
contravenes the conservation and management measures of regional fish-
eries management organization in its area of application; or  
(ii) in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable 
conservation or management measures and where such fishing activities 
are conducted in a manner inconsistent with India’s responsibilities for the 
conservation of living marine resources under international law.48 
 
India’s response to IUU fishing has focused on improving coordination 
and relations between the central government and the individual Indian 
states, as well as relations with neighboring coastal States. This approach has 
                                                                                                                      
45. Id. ch. II, § 3(1). 
46. Id. ch. VIII, § 16(1). 
47. Id. ch. III, § 5. 
48. Id. ch. I, § 2(o)(A–C). 
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regulated IUU fishing to consideration only as a non-traditional security is-
sue viewed primarily through socioeconomic development. In 2019, the 
Minister of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare, which administers the Depart-
ment of Fisheries, outlined the government’s response to IUU fishing in In-
dia’s Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) in response to a question ask-
ing what action had been taken to stop IUU fishing. The Minister stated: 
 
a) Adequate measures have been taken by the Government to prevent and 
control . . . (IUU) fishing in the . . . (EEZ) of India which, inter alia, include:  
 
1. Authorization of the Indian Coast Guard under the Maritime Zones of 
India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981 . . . to prevent 
IUU fishing by foreign fishing vessels in Indian waters. 
2. Regulation, monitoring, control and surveillance by agencies of Maritime 
States/Union Territories (UTs) under their respective Marine Fishing Reg-
ulation Acts (MFRAs) for preventing IUU fishing. 
3. Implementation of ReALCraft, a web based regime for mandatory reg-
istration of fishing vessels under [the] Merchant Shipping Act 1958 and 
licensing of fishing vessels under [the] respective MFRAs. 
4. Issuance of Biometric Identity cards to marine fishers. 
5. Notification of the National Policy on Marine Fisheries, 2017 that pro-
vides guidance for prevention, deterrence and eliminating IUU fishing in 
Indian waters. 
6. Issuance of guidelines from time to time for regulation of Indian fishing 
vessels in EEZ.49 
 
Further, the Minister concluded that the “Government of India regularly 
holds consultations with coastal states/UTs on the matters of marine 
fisheries development, management and regulation, which include pre-
vention of IUU fishing.”50 
In addition to those actions, in 2017, the Indian government revoked the 
letters of permit that had allowed foreign vessels to fish in the EEZ.51 How-
ever, as recently as April 2020, local fishers in southern India have reported 
                                                                                                                      
49. Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Farmers Welfare, LOK SABHA, Unregulated Fishing in Exclusive Economic Zone (Jan. 8, 2019), 
http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Members/QResult16.aspx?qref=78098. 
50. Id. 
51. Mahir Haneef, Govt Withdraws Permission for Foreign Vessels to Operate within India’s 
EEZ, TIMES OF INDIA, Mar. 6, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ko-
chi/govt-withdraws-permission-for-foreign-vessels-to-operate-within-indias-eez/arti-
cleshow/57502020.cms. 
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seeing foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ during the fish-breeding season.52 
Even before these sightings, the Ministry of Fisheries introduced a draft bill 
to prevent illegal fishing in Indian EEZ.53 Pending Cabinet approval, the 
draft bill assumes significance in the backdrop of growing illegal fishing in 
the EEZ. Under the proposed bill, the Indian state governments will be al-
lowed to issue a license for fishing in the EEZ at the Central government’s 
direction.54 The fishers who want to fish in EEZ have to cross the territorial 
sea that is governed by the individual states. Furthermore, the bill ensures 
that only Indian fishers with valid fishing licenses will be able to fish within 
the country’s EEZ. No foreign vessels can enter this zone except with a right 
to passage for which they have to apply for permission. 
In addition to these reforms, the government’s recently introduced draft 
National Fisheries Policy 2020 has placed a focus on IUU fishing and na-
tional security.55 National Fisheries Policy 2020 is largely an attempt to in-
vigorate fisheries and to promote inter-state cooperation in coastal area de-
velopment and ecotourism. There are, however, several legal and operational 
provisions that address IUU fishing and the resources necessary to combat 
it. It provides that the central, state, and UT governments will establish a 
sound and effective MCS system under which all fishing vessels will abide 
by MCS requirements and have suitable transponders and communication 
systems when at sea that disclose the latitude and longitudinal position of 
the vessel.56 The Indian Coast Guard, Coastal Police, and the regulatory and 
enforcement agencies are to be adequately trained and equipped to 
strengthen and implement the MCS system.57 Importantly, the government 
indicates it “will establish a sound mechanism to ensure that the Indian fish-
ing fleet does not engage in IUU fishing.”58 Further, the draft National Fish-
eries Policy recognizes the potential to expand the harvesting of the re-
sources of the high seas and promotes the use of necessary fishery resources 
                                                                                                                      
52. Coast Guard, Navy Must Prevent Foreign Fishing Vessels: Fishermen, OUTLOOK, Apr. 18, 
2020, https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/coast-guard-navy-must-prevent-foreign-
fishing-vessels-fishermen/1806907. 
53. Govt Drafts New Bill to Prevent Illegal Fishing in India’s EEZ, BUSINESS STANDARD, Jan. 
29, 2020, https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/govt-drafts-new-bill-to-
prevent-illegal-fishing-in-india-s-eez-120012901380_1.html. 
54. Id. 
55. Government of India, National Fisheries Policy, 2020, at 9, http://nfdb.gov.in/ 
PDF/National_Fisheries_Policy_2020.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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to achieve that goal, subject to compliance with relevant international agree-
ments.59 
But most importantly, the current Indian government’s approach to IUU 
fishing recognizes its interrelation with maritime security. This acknowledg-
ment opens up several avenues for collaboration and cooperation with other 
States and international organizations from which India can benefit. 
 
B. Domestic Legislation 
 
Two domestic legislative acts drive the government’s response to IUU fish-
ing. The first, the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic 
Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976,60 defines India’s maritime zones, 
which comply with the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea61 (UN-
CLOS) to which India is a party. Thus, India enjoys its sovereign rights, in-
cluding fishing rights, in the delimited waters under both domestic and in-
ternational maritime laws. 
The second, the Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Foreign Ves-
sels) Act, 1981, provides for the regulation of foreign fishing vessels in In-
dia’s maritime zones and related matters.62 It authorizes the Indian Coast 
Guard, when appropriate, to stop and board a fishing vessel, seize and detain 
the vessel, including any fishing gear, fishing equipment, stores, or cargo 
found onboard the vessel or belonging to the vessel, and to seize any fishing 
gear abandoned by the vessel.63 
These laws provide the domestic legislation governing India’s maritime 
zones and the national maritime security framework for addressing IUU fish-
ing by foreign vessels. Though the current maritime laws acknowledge the 
issue of foreign vessels in the Indian waters, adding the new and developing 
scenarios of such vessels conducting IUU fishing in these waters is important 
and adds depth to the legislation.  
 
                                                                                                                      
59. Id. at 8. 
60.  The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other 
Maritime Zones Act, 1976, No. 80, Acts of Parliament, 1976. 
61. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
62. The Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981, 
No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 1981. 
63. Id. § 9. 
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C. Maritime Enforcement Structures 
 
In a welcome step to enhance coastal maritime security, in 2019 the govern-
ment provided the Coast Guard additional authority under the Coast Guard 
Act of 1978.64 The Coast Guard now has the authority to visit, board, and 
seize vessels and objects suspected of being used to commit a crime. As the 
Act states, “every member of the Coast Guard” has the authority to: 
 
to visit board, search and seize any vessel, or arrest any person or seize any artificial 
island or any floating or moored object or any underwater object including 
any maritime property involved or suspected to be used in the commission 
of any offence . . . within the maritime zone[s] of India.”65 
 
Prior to the promulgation of the 2019 amendment, the Coast Guard had 
no specific authority to board a vessel transiting the EEZ. Instead, it used 
provisions of the Customs Act,66 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act,67 and other relevant legislation to board and seize vessels. How-
ever, this practice often resulted in unsuccessful criminal or civil actions and 
the filing of civil suits against the Coast Guard. The new authority, which the 
Coast Guard had been seeking for several years, closes these enforcement 
loopholes. 
The 2019 amendment complies with the boarding regime set forth in 
UNCLOS. Entitled “Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal 
State,” UNCLOS Article 73(1) provides: 
 
The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, 
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and 
judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the 
laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.68 
 
In turn, Article 14 of the Coast Guard Act of 1978 indicates the Coast 
Guard’s duties and functions are to “protect by such measures, as it thinks 
fit, the maritime and other national interests of India in the maritime zones 
                                                                                                                      
64. The Coast Guard Act, 1978, No. 30, Acts of Parliament, 1978 (India). 
65. Notification, 2019, Gazette of India, pt. II, sec. 4 (Dec. 5, 2019) (emphasis added). 
66. The Customs Act, 1962, No. 52, Acts of Parliament, 1962 (India). 
67. The Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
Act, 1988, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 1988 (India). 
68. UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 73(1). 
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of India.”69 Under this provision, the Coast Guard has apprehended foreign 
vessels and fishers from numerous countries, including Sri Lanka,70 Indone-
sia,71 and Myanmar,72 for violating various laws and regulations applicable in 
India’s maritime zones. 
The Indian Navy also conducts maritime law enforcement operations, 
notably those directed at piracy, but it also contributes to combating IUU 
fishing.73 The Navy has proven its capability to address IUU fishing and pi-
racy in Indian waters and beyond, under the powers vested in it by various 
legislative acts.74 It has successfully engaged in anti-piracy missions in the 
areas of primary interest to India, such as the Gulf of Aden, and conducted 
maritime domain surveillance operations ranging from the Andaman Sea to 
the Strait of Malacca.75 
These efforts complement mandates provided by U.N. Security Council 
resolutions and international maritime regimes such as UNCLOS. For ex-
ample, piracy, armed robbery at sea, and IUU fishing off the coast of Somalia 
have been addressed in a series of Security Council resolutions.76 These res-
olutions note the “complex relationship between IUU fishing and piracy, 
                                                                                                                      
69. The Coast Guard Act, supra note 64, art. 14. 
70. Ashish Pandey, Indian Coast Guard Apprehends 25 Sri Lankan Fishermen, INDIA TO-
DAY, Feb. 19, 2019, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/indian-coast-guard-appre-
hends-sri-lankan-fishermen-1460048-2019-02-19. 
71. Sanjib Kumar Roy, Indian Coast Guard Nabs Indonesian Fishing Boat with 39 Crew Mem-
bers for Illegal Fishing, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS, Oct. 31, 2017, https://www.newindianex-
press.com/nation/2017/oct/31/indian-coast-guard-nabs-indonesian-fishing-boat-with-
39-crew-members-for-illegal-fishing-1687630.html. 
72. Indian Coast Guard Apprehends Myanmarese Fishing Boats and 24 Poachers from Indian 
EEZ, UNITED NEWS OF INDIA, Sept. 17, 2019, http://www.uniindia.com/indian-coast-
guard-apprehends-myanmarese-fishing-boats-and-24-poachers-from-indian-
eez/east/news/1732191.htm. 
73. Indian Navy’s Anti-Piracy Patrol Seizes Arms and Ammunition off Somalia Coast from a 
Vessel, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Dec. 9, 2019, https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/in-
dian-navys-anti-piracy-patrol-seizes-arms-and-ammunition-off-somalia-coast-from-a-ves-
sel/1408234/. 
74. INDIAN NAVY, INDIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE 2015, https://www.indiannavy.nic. 
in/content/indian-maritime-doctrine-2015-version. 
75. See Anti-Piracy Operations, Gulf of Aden Deployment, INDIAN NAVY, https://www.indi-
annavy.nic.in/content/anti-piracy-operations-gulf-aden-deployment (last visited Oct. 8, 
2020); India Boosts Strait of Malacca Maritime Surveillance, MARITIME EXECUTIVE (Jan. 29, 
2016), https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/india-boosts-maritime-surveillance 
-near-strait-of-malacca. 
76. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2383 (Nov. 7, 2017). 
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recognizing that IUU fishing accounts for millions of dollars of lost revenue . 
. . and can contribute to destabilization among coastal communities.”77 
An example of the Indian Navy’s enforcement of a U.N. Security Coun-
cil resolution occurred in December 2018, when personnel from INS 
Sunayna boarded a vessel in the Gulf of Aden under the authority accorded 
by Security Council Resolution 2383.78 A search of the vessel found that it 
was engaged in illegal fishing and was also carrying four high-caliber AK-47s 
and one light machine gun, along with ammunition for these weapons.79 Act-
ing under UNCLOS Articles 105 and 107,80 the Sunayna could have seized 
the vessel as a pirate ship and arrested its crew. The ship, however, was al-
lowed to proceed after the confiscation of the arms and ammunition. 
 
D. International Law and IUU Fishing 
 
India became a party to UNCLOS in 1995 and has had nearly continuous 
representation on the Commission on the Limits on the Continental Shelf, 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas (ITLOS),81 and the Inter-
national Seabed Authority since their inception in 1997, 1996, and 1994, re-
spectively. UNCLOS and ITLOS jurisprudence provide the legal framework 
for India to further strengthen its domestic maritime law infrastructure on 
IUU fishing. 
For high seas fishery resources, UNCLOS sets forth only general princi-
ples of conservation, as well as optimal use of and management of re-
sources,82 all subject to interpretation in determining their application to IUU 
fishing. By contrast, UNCLOS provides a detailed framework governing fish 
stocks (and other natural resources) in a coastal State’s delimited waters, par-
ticularly those found in the EEZ. In defining the rights, jurisdiction, and 
duties of the coastal State in the EEZ, UNCLOS Article 56 provides that 
the coastal State has 
                                                                                                                      
77. Id. pmbl. 
78. Id. 
79. See supra note 73. 
80. See UNCLOS, supra note 61, art. 105 (“On the high seas, or in any other place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship 
or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize 
the property on board.”); see id. art. 107 (“A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out 
only by warships . . . clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and 
authorized to that effect . . . .”). 
81. There was an Indian judge on ITLOS from its inception in 1997 to 2017. 
82. UNCLOS, supra note 61, arts. 116–19. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2020 
458 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the 
waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with 
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of 
the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and 
winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Conven-
tion with regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and struc-
tures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.83 
 
In 2013, ITLOS was asked to provide an advisory opinion on four ques-
tions submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission concerning a 
State’s responsibility for IUU fishing by vessels flying its flag. The most rel-
evant question to the issue of fishing within another State’s EEZ asked, 
“What are the obligations of the flag State in cases where illegal, unreported 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities are conducted within the Exclusive 
Economic Zone of third party States?”84 Citing UNCLOS Articles 58(3), 
62(4), and 192, the Tribunal held that “[t]he flag State is under an obligation 
. . . to take the necessary measures to ensure that vessels flying its flag are 
not engaged in IUU fishing activities . . . within the exclusive economic zones 
of . . . [other] States.”85 The advisory opinion also addressed the flag State’s 
liability for IUU violations. Unaddressed was the question of what action a 
flag State is to take against a captain and crew engaged in IUU fishing. 
It is clear, however, that there is a requirement to act to prevent and deter 
future violations. Here, the Tribunal stated: 
 
While the nature of the laws, regulations and measures that are to be adopted 
by the flag State is left to be determined by each flag State in accordance 
with its legal system, the flag State nevertheless has the obligation to include 
in them enforcement mechanisms to monitor and secure compliance with 
                                                                                                                      
83. Id. art. 56. 
84. Request for Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commis-
sion, Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr. 2, 2015, ITLOS Rep. 4, 8 [hereinafter Request 
for Advisory Opinion]. 
85. Id. at 63. 
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these laws and regulations. Sanctions applicable to involvement in IUU fish-
ing activities must be sufficient to deter violations and to deprive offenders 
of the benefits accruing from their IUU fishing activities.86 
 
In well-documented cases involving the Hua Xiang 801, Hua Li, and Jing 
Yuan 626,87 which involved IUU fishing at various times in the Argentine 
EEZ, there have been no reports of action taken by China, the flag State, 
against the vessel owners, raising genuine concerns about China’s commit-
ment to ending IUU fishing by Chinese fishers. 
With regard to the question of possible flag-State liability for the acts of 
its fishers who engage in IUU fishing, the Tribunal noted that UNCLOS 
provides no guidance; thus, it was necessary to examine the question under 
the rules on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.88 
Under those rules, the Tribunal indicated that “the flag State is not liable if 
it has taken all necessary and appropriate measure measures to meet its ‘due 
diligence’ obligations to ensure vessels flying its flag do not conduct IUU 
fishing activities.”89 The advisory opinion thus not only reemphasizes that 
flag States must combat IUU fishing, but also confirms a flag State’s liability 
where its due diligence obligations are not discharged. I cannot help but 
note, however, notwithstanding the significance of the language, that the ad-
visory opinion was issued in 2015 and that the incidents cited above of IUU 
fishing in the Indian EEZ all occurred after that date.90 
 
E. Port Security 
 
Drafted under the auspices of the FAO, the Agreement on Port State 
Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unreg-
ulated (IUU) Fishing (PSMA)91 is the first binding international treaty de-
signed specifically to combat IUU fishing. Its objective is to prevent, deter, 
                                                                                                                      
86. Id. at 42. 
87. Juan Delgado, Argentina Requests International Arrest Warrant for Chinese Vessel, 
DIÁLOGO, Apr. 12, 2019, https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/argentina-requests-inter-
national-arrest-warrant-for-chinese-vessel/. 
88. Request for Advisory Opinion, supra note 84, at 43. 
89. Id. at 64. 
90. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
91. Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unre-
ported and Unregulated Fishing, opened for signature Nov. 22, 2009, 55 INTERNATIONAL LE-
GAL MATERIALS 1159 (2016) (entered into force June 5, 2016) [hereinafter Agreement on 
Port State Measures]. 
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and eliminate IUU fishing by preventing vessels engaged in IUU fishing 
from using ports and landing their catches. It recognizes that “measures to 
combat IUU fishing should build on the primary responsibility of flag States 
and use all available jurisdiction in accordance with international law, includ-
ing port State measures, coastal State measures, market-related measures, 
and measures to ensure that nationals do not support or engage in IUU fish-
ing.”92 There are currently sixty-five member States and the European Un-
ion, with its twenty-seven members.93 Within Asia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka are parties.94 
India has neither signed not ratified the PSMA as of this writing, nor publi-
cally provided a reason for not joining the treaty. 
PSMA Article 3 directs (with limited exceptions) party States to apply 
the agreement’s measures to foreign vessels seeking entry to their ports.95 
This enables port entry authorizations and identification procedures and re-
quirements, and the providing of any additionally needed information from 
foreign ships “to determine whether the vessel requesting entry into the port 
is engaged in IUU fishing.”96 Importantly, once a State has “sufficient proof” 
that a vessel has “engaged in IUU fishing or related activities,” the treaty 
requires coastal States to deny the vessel entry into its ports.97 
As an alternative to denial of entry, the port State may allow entry “ex-
clusively for the purpose of inspecting it [the vessel] and taking other appro-
priate actions in conformity with international law.”98 If it does allow entry, 
it must “deny the vessel the use of its port services for landing, transshipping, 
packing, and processing of fish”99 if the vessel does not have a valid author-
ization from either its flag State or the relevant coastal State, or if there are 
reasonable grounds that the vessel was engaged in IUU fishing.100 In other 
words, for these vessels, PSMA signatories are empowered to carry out in-
spections and take necessary enforcement actions in accordance with flag 
State domestic laws. 
                                                                                                                      
92. Id. pmbl. para. 3. 
93. Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA), Parties to the PSMA, FAO, http://www.fao. 
org/port-state-measures/background/parties-psma/en/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
94. Id. 
95. Agreement on Port State Measures, supra note 91, art. 3. 
96. Id. art. 9(1). 
97. Id. art. 9(4). Entries into ports for reasons of force majeure and distress are excepted 
from this requirement. See id. art. 10. 
98. Id. art. 9(5). 
99. Id. art. 9(6). 
100. Id. art. 11(1). 
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PSMA Article 21 addresses the special requirements of developing States 
that lack the required port infrastructure and facilities to comply with PSMA 
measures through the provision of technical and financial assistance and 
other cooperative arrangements.101 This assistance includes training of in-
spectors and the development and enhancement of MCS capacity, to include 
access to the necessary technology and equipment. 
 
F. Regional Institutions 
 
India is a member of the three regional multilateral organizations outlined 
below that have a specific focus on IUU fishing. These organizations address 
IUU fishing as a non-traditional security threat and their purpose is to 
strengthen inter-State cooperation within the region. 
The first organization is the Bay of Bengal Programme, an intergovern-
mental organization.102 In addition to India, its members are Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, and the Maldives. Its function is to enhance cooperation among 
member States, non-member States, and regional organizations, and to pro-
vide technical and management advisory services for maintaining sustainable 
coastal fisheries development in the Bay of Bengal. 
The second is the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission.103 This intergovern-
mental organization, composed of thirty-one States, manages tuna and tuna-
like species in the expansive Indian Ocean high seas area. It has a special 
focus on IUU fishing and maintains an IUU vessel database. It has an elab-
orate compliance infrastructure and provides special assistance to developing 
member States (and cooperating States) for capacity building to enhance 
compliance. 
The third organization is the Indian Ocean Rim Association, which is a 
ministerial level intergovernmental organization.104 One of the organization’s 
priorities has been addressing fisheries issues, principally as a threat to food 
security, livelihoods, and income generation. The organization has thirty-one 
member States and provides an appropriate platform for bolstering regional 
cooperation on IUU fishing. Still, its action plan for 2017 through 2021 
                                                                                                                      
101. Id. art. 21. 
102. BAY OF BENGAL PROGRAMME, https://www.bobpigo.org/ (last visited Oct. 8, 
2020). 
103. INDIAN OCEAN TUNA COMMISSION, https://iotc.org/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
104. INDIAN OCEAN RIM ASSOCIATION, https://www.iora.int/en (last visited Oct. 8, 
2020). 
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views IUU fishing only as a fisheries management issue.105 Accordingly, there 
is room to broaden the initiative to enhance maritime safety and improve 
maritime security by aligning domestic IUU fishing efforts with regional 
norms and institutions. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
The article presented two major themes. First, it argues that the Indian gov-
ernment views on IUU fishing should be expanded to recognize that IUU 
fishing is not just a food security and economic security threat but a national 
security threat. Second, it argues that although India has a robust maritime 
legal and institutional infrastructure to address IUU fishing, this infrastruc-
ture can be strengthened through greater involvement with existing legal re-
gimes and regional and international organizations. By so doing, it will avoid 
duplicating the efforts taken by other countries against common threats, 
while enhancing its role in these regimes and organizations, particularly those 
at the regional level. 
Finally, this article concludes with the following specific recommenda-
tions. First, the Indian government should highlight incidents of IUU fishing 
more often in open sources, such as government websites and media reports, 
to increase public awareness. This approach should also include a wider shar-
ing of data points on the volume of IUU fishing, countries engaged in the 
IUU fishing near the Indian EEZ, and the impact of IUU fishing on India’s 
GDP. Similarly, India’s maritime security enforcement institutions need to 
widely disseminate information on foreign vessels present in the EEZ and 
to provide a list of suspected IUU vessels denied port access or privileges. 
Databases containing this information can assist the government in its poli-
cymaking at both the domestic and global levels and inform scholars’ and 
practitioners’ understanding of the nature and impact of IUU fishing. 
Second, the Indian government should use its position in the Indian 
Ocean and its membership in regional organizations to generate active and 
continuous support for combating IUU fishing as a regional security threat. 
India has augmented the maritime domain awareness information available 
to smaller nations by using naval assets to conduct patrols of waters adjacent 
to the Seychelles and Mauritius. At the regional level, however, the focus is 
                                                                                                                      
105. INDIAN OCEAN RIM ASSOCIATION, IORA ACTION PLAN 2017–2021, https:// 
www.iora.int/media/1031/iora-action-plan-7-march-2017.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
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still on IUU fishing as impacting food and economic security, not as a na-
tional security threat. 
Third, India should become a party to the PSMA. Becoming a State party 
to the PSMA would provide several benefits, including implementing 
measures to ensure better detection and investigation of IUU fishing activi-
ties and capacity building of developing States to enhance cooperation in 
addressing this common threat. Membership would support and comple-
ment efforts to address IUU fishing, both globally and in the Indian Ocean 
region, including within the Indian EEZ. 
Fisheries form the core of India’s blue economy, which encompasses a 
myriad of economic opportunities such as maritime transport, renewable en-
ergy, waste management, and tourism.106 Fishing provides food and nutri-
tional security, a livelihood to millions, and trade opportunities, all of which 
are threatened by IUU fishing. Addressing the challenge of IUU fishing and 
ensuring sustainable fisheries practices are crucial elements of the U.N.’s 
Sustainable Developmental Goals.107 Moreover, several studies highlight that 
the Indian Ocean’s resources have the potential to sustain an increased pro-
duction of fisheries.108 But that potential can create a perverse incentive. Dis-
tant water fishing fleets are a growing reality. Despite international efforts to 
curb IUU fishing, these fleets have largely evaded national and international 
regulatory approaches. The South China Sea, Western Pacific, and Atlantic 
Ocean littorals have long faced the threats of IUU fishing; now, there is a 
growing threat in the Indian Ocean. For India, IUU fishing needs to become 
an integral part of the national security discourse. 
 
                                                                                                                      
106. Blue Economy Crucial for India’s Economic Development: Union Shipping Minister Nitin 
Gadkari, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Nov. 27, 2018, https://www.financialexpress.com/econ-
omy/blue-economy-crucial-for-indias-economic-development-union-shipping-minister-
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107. Sustainable Development Goals, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 
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(last visited Oct. 8, 2020) (noting that Life Below Water is goal 14). 
108. See, e.g., Hamant Maini & Lipi Budhraja, Ocean-Based Blue Economy: An Insight 
into the SAGAR as the Last Growth Frontier , NITI AAYOG, https://niti.gov.in/writere-
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